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BC’s MINISTRY OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY RELEASES POLICE DOG 
STATISTICS
In February 2019 the Policing and Security Branch 
of BC’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General released data reported to the Director of 
Police Services on the use of police services dogs 
(PSD) for 2017. 
The total number of PSD locations, 
apprehensions and arrests. This 
included 2,113 by the RCMP and 
LMIPDS followed by  the Vancouver Police (555), 
Victoria Police (56), Saanich Police (34) and West 
Vancouver Police (25). 
The total number of subjects bitten by 
a PSD. A bite  is defined as “a police 
dog’s use of mouth and teeth to grab 
or hold a person’s body or clothes”. The RCMP and 
LMIPDS accounted for 213 bites, followed by 
Vancouver (99), Victoria  (7), West Vancouver (6) 
and Saanich (1). There were 10 non-subject 
civilians and six non-subject police officers bitten.
The total number of tracks or 
searches for suspects . This 
included 4,089 by the RCMP and 
LMIPDS. Vancouver (1,256), Victoria (98), Saanich 
(92) and West Vancouver (52) followed.
The total number of apprehensions 
by bite or display. There were 
1,022 apprehensions made by the 
RCMP and LMIPDS, while Vancouver made 561, 
followed by Victoria  (46), West Vancouver (23) and 
Saanich (15).
The total number of tracks or searches 
for missing persons. 
The total number of searches for drugs. 
This included 333 by the RCMP and 
LMIPDS followed by Victoria (19) and 
Vancouver (11).
The total number of searches for 
explosives or firearms. There were 378 
by the RCMP and LMIPDS, while the 
Transit Police made 34 followed by Vancouver (20 
and Victoria (17).
The total number of searches for 
evidence. This included 1,159 by 
the RCMP and LMIPDS followed by 
Victoria and Saanich with 32 each, Vancouver (12) 
and West Vancouver (6).
See the complete statistical report here.
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Abbotsford, Delta, New Westminster, and Port Moody form part of the 
RCMP Lower Mainland Integrated Police Dog Service (LMIPDS). 
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Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for 2019
Introduction to Surveillance - Footing  @ 
New West Campus: September 5-6
Basic Tactical Surveillance @ New West 
Campus: September 9-13
General Investigative Skills @ Victoria 
Campus: September 16-20
Interviewing Special Needs Witnesses @ 
New West Campus: September 18-20 
          
Advanced Tactical Surveillance @ New West 
Campus: September 23-26
Search & Seizure @ New West Campus: 
September 23-27
Coaching and Mentoring @ Victoria 
Campus: September 25-27
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
5 day weekend: freedom to make your life and 
work rich with purpose.
Nik Halik & Garrett B. Gunderson.
Austin, TX: Bard Press, 2017.
G 179 H35 2017
Exercise-based interventions for mental illness: 
physical activity as part of clinical treatment.
edited by Brendon Stubbs & Simon Rosenbaum.
London, UK; San Diego, CA: Elsevier: Academic 
Press, 2018.
RC 455.2 E947 E94 2018
Evil: the science behind humanity's dark side.
Julia Shaw.
Toronto, ON: Doubleday Canada, 2019.
BF 789 E94 S53 2019
Fundamental justice: section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Hamish Stewart.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2019.
KE 4381.5 S74 2019
Great at work: how top performers do less, work 
better, and achieve more.
Morten T. Hansen.
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2018.
HD 57 H356 2018
Lead with a story: a guide to crafting business 
narratives that captivate, convince, and inspire.
Paul Smith.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
2012.
HD 30.3 S5774 2012
The mediator's toolkit: formulating and asking 
questions for successful outcomes.
Gerry O'Sullivan.
Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2018.
HM 1126 O885 2018
Mental: everything you never knew you needed 
to know about mental health.
Dr. Steve Ellen & Catherine Deveny.
London, UK: Head of Zeus, 2018.
RA 790 E44 2018
Never enough: the neuroscience and experience 
of addiction.
Judith Grisel.
New York, NY: Doubleday, 2019.
RC 564 G75 2019
The PTSD workbook: simple, effective techniques 
for overcoming traumatic stress symptoms.
Mary Beth Williams, PhD, LCSW, CTS & Soili 
Poijula, PhD.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 
2016.
RC 552 P67 W544 2016
Simplify work: crushing complexity to liberate 
innovation, productivity, and engagement.
Jesse W. Newton.
New York, NY: Morgan James Publishing, 2019.
HD 58.9 N48 2019
Skin in the game: hidden asymmetries in daily 
life.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
New York, NY: Random House, 2018.
HM 1101 T35 2018
Teaching, coaching and mentoring adult learners: 
lessons for professionalism and partnership.
edited by Heather Fehring & Susan Rodrigues.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, an 
imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.
LC 5225 L42 T43 2017
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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CBSA SEIZURES
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) released its 
seizure statistics for the 2018-2019 fiscal year 
(accessed May 19,  2019). The fiscal year begins on 
April 1 and ends on March 31 the following year. 
DRUGS
Cannabis products, includes dried and fresh 
cannabis, cannabis seeds, resin, solids, non-solids, 
concentrates and synthetic cannabis.
Cocaine/crack includes coca leaves, coca paste, 
cocaine and cocaine crack.
Firearms include non-restricted, restricted, and 
prohibited firearms.
Cannabis Products 
Grams 1,296,623
Dosage 333,963
ml 25,698
Cocaine/Crack
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
2,859,965 grams 1,429,465 grams -50%
Heroin
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
189,956 grams 119,884 grams -37%
Fentanyl
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
14,605 grams 5,166 grams -65%
Firearms
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
751 696 -7%
Prohibited Weapons
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
10,485 22,264 +112%
Child Pornography
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
303 227 -25%
Currency
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
$31,280,682 $32,899,456 +5%
Suspected Proceeds of Crime
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
$2,831,415 $2,808,831 -1%
Alcohol
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
16,303 litres 22,070 litres +35%
Tobacco
2017/2018 2018/2019
Cartons 343,098 14,560
Kg 90,081 161,384
Number 78,729 252,800
Jewelry
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
7,698 seizures 6,839 seizures -11%
Total Seizures
2017/2018 2018/2019 Change
30,689 47,765 +56%
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GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR 
ARREST NOT TO BE VIEWED IN 
ISOLATION
R. v. Omeasoo & White, 2019 MBCA 43         
At about 1:40 a.m. the police 
received information from a  911 
caller that a red “Chevy” Silverado 
truck had cut off the driver of another 
vehicle. The caller reported that the 
truck followed the other vehicle and pulled 
over.  Two males exited the truck and were armed 
with handguns. No shots were fired.  The caller, 
who was not involved in the incident, described the 
two males as white, one wearing a  white hoodie 
and a baseball cap, and the other wearing a  black 
hoodie or sweater and a baseball cap.
Two police officers near the area responded to this 
firearm involved road-rage incident. As they drove 
on the street where the red truck was seen by the 
caller, they saw no other vehicles on the road. But 
they did see a red truck parked at a Tim Horton’s 
restaurant nearby. The truck was a Dodge Ram, was 
the only vehicle in the parking lot, and was 
occupied by two males. The officers watched the 
passenger, who was wearing blue jeans, a black 
shirt and a baseball cap, go into the Tim Horton’s 
restaurant towards the washrooms. Two to four 
minutes later, they saw him leave the washroom 
area, go to the cashier and return to the truck 
carrying a  juice bottle. In addition to the cashier, 
there  were at most two other people in the 
restaurant.
Concerned about the safety  of people in the area, 
the officers went to speak to the truck’s occupants 
at 1:54 a.m. to investigate whether they were 
involved in the firearms incident. One officer went 
to the driver’s side of the truck and noticed that it 
was running. The driver was not wearing  a baseball 
cap and the passenger was Indigenous. The second 
officer went to the passenger side of the truck. He 
used his flashlight but did not see any firearms. The 
driver provided identification in the name of the 
accused White while the passenger verbally 
identified himself as Joseph Omeasoo. The names 
were checked in the police computer but there 
were no outstanding warrants or court orders. At 
2:00 a.m. the men were told they were free to go.
One of the officers then went to use the washroom 
inside the Tim Horton’s restaurant. He found a .22 
calibre bullet in the urinal and showed it to his 
partner. The officers determined that they now had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the men had 
been involved in the firearms incident and that the 
passenger had left the bullet in the urinal. At 2:06 
a.m., the officer returned to the truck and arrested 
the men for a “firearms investigation.” The accused 
Omeasoo’s name was determined to be Jaden, not 
Joseph, and it was learned he was breaching a 
probation order. The men were advised of their s. 
10(b) Charter rights and the truck was searched. 
Police found  a “crack pipe” and crystal 
methamphetamine.  When they searched the 
accused Omeasoo at the police station, they found 
crack cocaine. The truck was again searched at the 
police station and police found a .22 calibre assault 
rifle, a prohibited clip for the rifle with ammunition 
and more than two kilograms of illegal drugs, 
including cocaine, marihuana, fentanyl, MDMA 
and methamphetamine.  The men were charged 
with possessing cocaine, methamphetamine and 
ecstasy for the purpose  of trafficking and several 
firearms offences.  The accused White was also 
charged with additional weapons offences.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown conceded that the officers’ 
initial contact with the  accused was an 
investigative detention and the police 
failed to advise the men of their s. 10 
rights. The officers did not tell the  men why they 
were being detained nor provide them with their 
right to counsel. During cross-examination by 
defence, the officers were questioned about the 
differences between the information they had 
received about the firearms incident from the 911 
call and what they observed. In particular, defence 
counsel highlighted the following:
• the truck was a red Dodge Ram not a red 
Chevrolet Silverado;
• only  one of the males was white (the other was 
Indigenous);
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• only one of the males was wearing a  baseball 
cap; and
• the passenger was wearing a black shirt, but 
neither of the males was wearing a hoodie or a 
sweater. 
One of the officers responded that he could not tell 
the difference between a  Chevrolet Silverado and a 
Dodge Ram and that, in his 12-years of police 
experience, people very often get the make and 
model of a  vehicle wrong. When it was suggested 
to the other officer that the passenger was 
Indigenous not white, he said, “It never crossed my 
mind.”  He also said that people sometimes get 
things right and sometimes they get things wrong. 
The officers testified that they did not believe they 
had grounds to arrest the accused until the bullet 
was found in the urinal. At that point, they believed 
they had reasonable grounds to arrest the men 
because  the truck was found in the area of the 
firearm incident, it matched the general description 
of the suspect vehicle, there were two male 
occupants and they found the bullet in the 
washroom where the passenger had just been.
The judge found that the accused White’s Charter 
rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10 had been breached 
while the accused Omeasoo’s rights had been 
infringed only under ss. 9 and 10 because he did 
not have  standing to challenge the lawfulness of the 
search of the truck as its passenger. In the judge’s 
view, the men had been detained when the officers 
initially  approached the truck but were not advised 
of their s. 10 rights (as conceded by Crown). And, 
even after finding the bullet the police only had 
enough to detain the  men, not arrest them. He 
described the connection of the bullet to the 
firearm incident “tentative at best” and it did not 
materially  change the facts. Rather, its discovery 
was as “close to being a red herring as it could 
possibly  be, rather than significant new evidence” 
and was insufficient to provide the necessary 
grounds for arrest. The judge found the initial s. 10 
breach tainted all that followed even though the 
men were advised of their s. 10 rights on arrest. 
Since the men had been unlawfully arrested the 
search of the truck was unreasonable as was the 
search of the accused Omeasoo’s person. All of the 
evidence found in the truck and on the accused 
Omeasoo was excluded under s. 24(2). The charges 
were dismissed.
Manitoba Court of Appeal 
The Crown argued, among 
other things, that the trial 
judge got it wrong in holding 
that the arrest of the men and 
the subsequent searches incidental thereto 
breached the  Charter. Moreover, if the arrest was 
lawful, the Crown asserted that the s. 10(b) breach 
would not result in the exclusion of evidence.  The 
accused, on the other hand, contended (in part) 
that the trial judge got it right in applying the law to 
the facts and the admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Arrest
In determining whether the police had the power to 
arrest, Justice Lemaistre stated:
Section 495(1)(a) of the Code provides the 
police with the power to arrest a person whom 
they believe, on reasonable grounds, has 
committed an indictable offence without the 
need to obtain a warrant.  The requirement of 
reasonable grounds involves a subjective belief 
that is objectively grounded.  In other words, a 
“Section 495(1)(a) of the Code provides the police with the power to arrest a person 
whom they believe, on reasonable grounds, has committed an indictable offence without 
the need to obtain a warrant.  The requirement of reasonable grounds involves a subjective 
belief that is objectively grounded.  In other words, a reasonable person, standing in the 
shoes of the officer would believe reasonable grounds to arrest exist.  The police do not 
need to establish a prima facie case for conviction before making the arrest.”
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reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the 
officer would believe reasonable grounds to 
arrest exist.  The police do not need to establish 
a prima facie case for conviction before making 
the arrest. 
When determining whether an officer’s 
subjective belief of the existence of reasonable 
grounds is objectively reasonable, a court must 
not assess the various factors relied upon by the 
officer in isolation.  The totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time 
must be taken into account. The officer is 
entitled to rely on information received from 
third parties, reject information he or she 
believes is unreliable and draw inferences. ...
Establishing a reasonable belief is not a high or 
overly onerous standard to meet.  [references 
omitted, paras. 29-31]
In this case, the Court of Appeal held the trial judge 
erred in determining whether the officers’ 
subjective beliefs that they had reasonable grounds 
to arrest the accused after finding the bullet were 
objectively reasonable. “In my view, the  trial judge 
failed to assess the totality  of the circumstances 
when considering the reasonableness of the 
officers’ beliefs that there were grounds to arrest,” 
said Justice Lemaistre. “He dealt with the evidence 
in a piecemeal fashion and failed to consider the 
cumulative effect of all of the facts and 
circumstances known to the officers at the time of 
the arrest on a holistic basis to determine whether, 
objectively, they had reasonable grounds to believe 
an offence  had been committed.” And he also 
failed “to consider the facts and circumstances 
from the perspective of the officers.” Justice 
Lemaistre continued:
The officers testified that they believed that 
finding the bullet in the washroom minutes 
after Omeasoo had been there in the context of 
the firearms investigation, together with the 
other information that they had, provided the 
necessary grounds to arrest the accused.   In 
other words, the bullet elevated their suspicion 
to a belief that the accused possessed a firearm 
that had just been pointed at a member of the 
public.
In my view, the trial judge’s characterisation of 
the discovery of the bullet as a “red herring” is 
a failure to recognise the connection between 
the bullet and the firearms incident under 
investigation.   It is a failure, as a matter of law, 
to appreciate the significance of a fact in the 
context of the surrounding circumstances, 
which includes the nature of the investigation 
and the officers’ experience and training. 
[reference omitted, para 38-39]
And further:
The evidence established that, prior to arresting 
the accused, the officers had information that 
two males in a red truck on Archibald Street at 
Watt Street were involved in a firearms 
incident.  The males were described as white, 
one wearing a white hoodie and a baseball cap 
and the other wearing a black hoodie or 
sweater and a baseball cap.  Within 14 minutes 
after the incident, the officers, who saw no 
other vehicles along the way, found a red truck 
with two male occupants. The truck was 
running and was parked in a Tim Horton’s 
restaurant parking lot not far from the location 
of the incident. There were no other vehicles in 
the parking lot and, at most, three people 
(including the cashier) in the Tim Horton’s 
restaurant.  The truck’s passenger, who was 
wearing a black shirt and a baseball cap, went 
into the Tim Horton’s restaurant towards the 
washrooms.  Minutes later, one of the officers 
found the bullet in the washroom. 
“When determining whether an officer’s subjective belief of the existence of reasonable 
grounds is objectively reasonable, a court must not assess the various factors relied upon 
by the officer in isolation. The totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the 
time must be taken into account. The officer is entitled to rely on information received 
from third parties, reject information he or she believes is unreliable and draw inferences.”
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The only d i sc repancies be tween the 
information initially provided to the officers 
and what they discovered, were the make and 
model of the red truck; only one of the two 
males was wearing a baseball cap; one of the 
males was Indigenous not white; and, while 
one of the males was wearing a black shirt, 
neither of the males was wearing a hoodie. 
In my view, the officers’ beliefs that the males 
in the truck had been involved in a firearms 
incident 26 minutes prior to their arrest was 
objectively reasonable in light of the 
constellation of factors known to them at the 
time of the arrest.  This is so particularly in light 
of the evidence which established that [one 
officer] could not differentiate between a 
Chevrolet Silverado and a Dodge Ram; it did 
not occur to [the other officer] that the 
passenger was Indigenous; and, in both of the 
officers’ experience, details provided by 911 
callers can be wrong.   In my view, the trial 
judge erred in finding that the arrests breached 
section 9 of the Charter. [paras. 41-43]
Search
Under the common law, “the police are permitted 
to conduct warrantless searches incident to arrest 
provided that the arrest is lawful, the search is 
conducted for a legitimate  purpose related to the 
arrest and the search is reasonably conducted.”  
Since the officers had reasonable  grounds to arrest 
the accused for the firearm incident, the searches of 
the truck and the accused Omeasoo were well 
within the scope of this common law power. “The 
searches were connected to the offence and 
conducted in order to protect the police and the 
public and to discover and preserve evidence,” 
said Justice Lemaistre.  And there was no suggestion 
that the manner in which the searches were 
conducted was unreasonable. The warrantless 
searches did not breach s. 8 of the Charter. 
Admissibility
Despite the Crown’s concession of a s. 10 Charter 
breach when the  officers initially approached the 
truck and detained the accused for investigative 
purposes but did not advise them of their right to 
counsel, the Court of Appeal found the evidence 
should not be excluded:
The interaction between the officers and the 
accused during the initial contact was brief, 
minimally invasive and relatively innocuous.  
The officers approached the vehicle to 
investigate whether the occupants had a 
firearm and to ensure the safety of people in the 
area.   When they found nothing to connect the 
accused to the firearms incident, the officers 
released them.  The officers proceeded 
cautiously and acted reasonably and in good 
faith in the context of a firearms investigation.  
In my view, the seriousness of the Charter -
infringing state conduct does not favour 
exclusion of the evidence.
The initial detention lasted only six minutes; 
led to no incriminatory statements or evidence; 
had almost no impact on the decision to arrest 
the accused and search them and the truck; 
and the Charter breach was remedied when the 
accused were advised of their section 10 rights 
upon arrest. Any impact of the section 10 when 
the officers initially approached the truck and 
spoke to the accused, they were detained for 
investigative purposes and should have been 
adv i sed o f the i r sec t ion 10 Char te r 
rights. breach on the Charter-protected interests 
of the accused would not warrant exclusion of 
the evidence.
The officers were investigating a firearms 
incident in response to a 911 call.   The charges 
the accused faced were serious.   The evidence 
discovered during the search of the truck and 
Omeasoo was reliable and essential to the 
Crown’s case.   Society has a strong interest in 
the adjudication of this case on its merits. 
[references omitted, paras. 52-54]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial 
was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The police are permitted to conduct 
warrantless searches incident to arrest 
provided that the arrest is lawful, the 
search is conducted for a legitimate 
purpose related to the arrest and the 
search is reasonably conducted.”  
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‘NON-CUSTODIAL’ INTERVIEW 
OF ACCUSED ALREADY UNDER 
ARREST A ‘LEGAL FICTION’
R. v. Heppner, 2019 BCCA 108
Police officers arrested the accused 
on British Columbia’s Wildlife  Act 
warrant for unlawfully trafficking in 
moose  meat. He was handcuffed and 
advised of the reason for his 
arrest ,and his right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay. He was transported to the police 
station while officers awaited instructions from the 
warrant’s issuing agency. He was booked, 
fingerprinted and advised that he would likely be 
released soon on a promise to appear. He was 
given an opportunity to consult counsel.
The accused was also flagged on CPIC as “Special 
Interest Police” for an aggravated assault that 
occurred about two (2) months earlier in a motel. 
He was the only suspect in the investigation which 
was being conducted by a nearby police 
department. The arresting agency’s officers 
contacted the  officers in charge of the aggravated 
assault investigation and told them the accused 
was in custody. The investigating  officers quickly 
attended the arresting agency to interview the 
accused. In doing so, they decided to conduct a 
“non-custodial” interview of the accused. 
He was escorted from cells to another room where 
the investigating officers were waiting. He was told 
the officers were investigating  “an assault” that 
took place at the motel and that he was a  suspect 
in it. The officer told the accused she knew that he 
was in the custody of the holding agency and the 
warrant had nothing to do with what they wanted 
to speak with him about. She also told him that he 
did not have to talk with them and that he was free 
to leave at any time. The accused responded, “I’ll 
talk with you.” A 32-minute interview followed in 
which the accused denied he was ever in the motel 
room where the assault occurred. The accused was 
escorted back to cells where he was released about 
three  minutes later on a  promise to appear. He had 
been at the police station for about two (2) hours in 
total.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused asserted that his rights 
under ss.  10(a) and (b) of the Charter 
were breached and his statement to 
police ought to have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). He argued that he was physically 
detained at the time of the interview and that it 
was “staged” in an attempt to circumvent 
compliance with ss. 10(a) and (b) of the  Charter in 
relation to the assault investigation. Since the 
police to failed to immediately  inform him they 
were  investigating an aggravated assault, his 
s. 10(a) rights were breached. And, since the police 
shifted the focus of their investigation from the 
Wildlife Act warrant to the aggravated assault, his 
s.  10(b) rights were also infringed because the 
police failed to re-inform him of his right to retain 
and instruct counsel in relation to the assault 
before interviewing him. 
The judge concluded that the accused was not 
psychologically detained during the interview on 
the aggravated assault. The accused was 
sophisticated in dealing with the police, the police 
questioning was polite and non-accusatory, and 
the officers made clear there was no connection 
between the assault investigation and the Wildlife 
Act warrant. Further, the investigators had not 
concluded their investigation and did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest him, the door to the 
interview room was open, and the officers told him 
he was free to leave. Since the accused was not 
detained, the  police were under no obligation to 
comply with s. 10 of the Charter. The accused’s 
statement, in which he lied about never being in 
the motel room, was admitted and used by the 
Crown to discredit him in cross-examination. He 
was convicted of aggravated sexual assault.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
conviction arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
conc lud ing he was no t 
detained when he gave his statement to police 
about the assault while in custody on the Wildlife 
Act warrant. The Crown, on the other hand, 
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submitted that an officer lacking reasonable 
grounds to arrest for one investigation can 
nevertheless conduct a “non-custodial” interview of 
that person while they are detained on another 
mat te r. Here , the Crown sugges ted the 
repositioning of the accused within the police 
station, providing an explanation the interview 
concerned a different investigation, and telling him 
he could leave the room at any  time meant there 
was no detention for the purposes of the interview.
s. 10 Charter - Right to Counsel
Justice Fitch, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, first reviewed the reason for the rights 
afforded under s. 10 of the Charter:
 
The rights in ss. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter are 
linked. An arrestee must be informed of the 
reason(s) for the arrest so he or she can make 
an informed choice about whether to exercise 
the right to counsel and, if the right is 
exercised, to obtain legal advice based on an 
understanding of the extent of his or her 
jeopardy. [reference omitted, para. 63]
“Detention” or “arrest” in s. 10 identifies the  point 
at which the right to counsel is triggered. 
Detention
In this case, the Appeal Court disagreed with the 
trial judge’s finding that the accused was not 
detained when he was interviewed. Justice Fitch 
wrote:
I cannot accept the factual and legal fiction the 
Crown would have us endorse. The [accused] 
was under arrest at all material times. He was 
under legal compulsion to remain at the WVPD 
station until he was released on the promise to 
appear. To suggest that the [accused] was not 
detained when he was interviewed by the VPD 
because he could have left the interview room 
ignores the reality of his situation. In my view, 
the VPD could no more conduct a “non-
custodial” interview of the [accused] in 
furtherance of the aggravated assault 
investigation than the WVPD could have had 
they been asked to conduct the interview on 
behalf of the VPD. To accede to the Crown’s 
position on this point would permit the police 
to unfairly manipulate the circumstances of an 
individual’s detention to circumvent the 
purposes of ss.  10(a) and (b) and the 
constitutional interests those rights are designed 
to protect.
“The rights in ss. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter are linked. An arrestee must be 
informed of the reason(s) for the arrest so he or she can make an informed 
choice about whether to exercise the right to counsel and, if the right is 
exercised, to obtain legal advice based on an understanding of the extent of his 
or her jeopardy.”
s. 10 Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
a. to be informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor;
b. to retain and instruct counsel without delay 
and to be informed of that right; ...
Charter of Rights
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It follows that this was a case of physical 
detention. ... [paras. 66-67]
Since the accused was under detention when he 
was interviewed, the police should have re-
informed him of his right to counsel. There was a 
change in his jeopardy occasioned by  the shift in 
focus of the investigation from the Wildlife Act 
warrant to the aggravated assault. “A detainee must 
be given a further opportunity to consult with 
counsel if a  significant change in jeopardy occurs 
during the course of a detention,” said Justice 
Fitch. He continued:
The [accused’s] jeopardy significantly changed 
when the VPD officers arrived to question him 
about his involvement in the aggravated 
assault. The focus of the investigation shifted 
from trafficking in moose meat to an offence 
that carries with it a maximum term of 
imprisonment of 14 years. Although the VPD 
officers had no confirmation at the time of the 
interview that the complainant had been 
sexually assaulted, they knew this was a 
possibil i ty. The maximum penalty for 
aggravated sexual assault is life imprisonment.
The legal advice the [accused] received 
pertained to obtaining his release on a promise 
to appear in relation to the outstanding warrant. 
That advice was not at all responsive to the very 
serious jeopardy he was in at the time of the 
VPD interview. The [accused] was in need of 
immediate legal advice to make an informed 
choice about whether to participate in the 
interview. The police had a duty to re-inform 
him of his right to counsel and, if the right was 
asserted, facilitate further contact with counsel 
before proceeding with the interview. Their 
failure to do so resulted in a violation of the 
[accused’s] s. 10(b) rights.  [paras. 74-75]
Based on the s. 10(b) breach, the accused’s 
statement was excluded as evidence.  The Court of 
Appeal considered it unnecessary  to rule on 
whether there was also a s. 10(a) breach in the 
circumstances.
Despite the accused’s interview statement being 
excluded, he had earlier told the same lie in 
another unchallenged statement which could be 
used, among other factors, to impeach his 
credibility and reject his evidence. Thus, the 
admission of the interview was a harmless error 
and would not have affected the  trial judge’s 
verdict. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GROUNDS FOR ARREST MUST 
BE VIEWED CUMULATIVELY 
THROUGH OFFICER’s 
EXPERIENCE
R. v. Holmes, 2019 BCCA 138
A drug investigation team leader 
received information from police 
sources suggesting that a  man and his 
wife had been involved in the illegal 
marihuana trade in the past, and, 
more recently, the man was charged with drug 
offences. Police sources also alleged that the man 
was a marihuana broker for organized gangs. A 
confidential source  told the team leader that the 
couple packaged marihuana at their house for 
distribution.
After unsuccessfully attempting to follow the man’s 
vehicle due to his evasive driving manoeuvers, 
police conducted surveillance of the couple’s home 
including walking by  and monitoring a  live feed 
camera installed across the street. When 
surveillance was carried out, police observed 
vehicles arriving and leaving the couple’s 
residence. They saw the man and others moving 
boxes and large bags between the house and the 
vehicles. One of the vehicles observed on two 
occasions was a gold coloured Honda Accord 
driven by a woman, but registered to a male. On 
the second occasion, the female driver was 
identified as the accused.
“A detainee must be given a further 
opportunity to consult with counsel if a 
significant change in jeopardy occurs 
during the course of a detention.”
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One day, the police saw the accused arrive at the 
home where she took  two black garbage bags from 
the trunk of the gold Honda and brought them into 
the house. A little later, the man arrived at the 
house and the accused helped him unload a 
number of bags from his vehicle and take them 
inside. This included a heavy brown sack carried by 
the accused. Around noon, the accused left the 
residence but returned a  half hour later. She then 
assisted the man in loading at least three large 
garbage bags into the trunk of the gold Honda. The 
accused got into the car and drove away. The police 
followed and pulled her over soon after she left. 
The team leader could smell “an overwhelming 
odour of car freshener” when he approached, 
something he was aware people use to mask the 
odour of marihuana. He examined her driver’s 
licence, explained he was conducting a drug 
investigation and asked her to step out of the car. 
He arrested her for possessing  marihuana and her 
car was searched. A shopping bag and a garbage 
bag, both containing marihuana, were found in the 
back seat and three large garbage bags in the trunk 
contained marihuana. In total, about 73 lbs. of 
marihuana was discovered.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge ruled the accused’s arrest 
lawful. He considered the historical 
information the team leader had about 
the man from police sources and a 
confidential informer concerning his involvement 
with the police and drug-related offences. He also 
considered police attempts to follow the man’s 
vehicle that were met with counter-surveillance 
techniques, and the movement of vehicles and 
people arriving  at and leaving the  man’s residence. 
As well, the accused and the man were seen 
loading large garbage bags into the trunk of the 
golden Honda. Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, including the man’s interactions 
with the police, the  information obtained from 
police sources and the confidential informer, and 
all of the activity seen at the man’s residence, the 
police had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused. The judge also considered the team 
leader’s lengthy experience as a police  officer (18 
years) and his involvement in many drug 
investigations. The judge rejected the accused’s 
efforts to challenge the grounds on a “piece meal 
basis” and noted that the cumulative effect of the 
evidence must be taken into account when 
considering whether reasonable grounds for the 
arrest were present. “In these circumstances and 
upon a consideration of the totality of the 
information [the team leader] had at the time of 
the arrest ... , combined with his experience and 
knowledge ..., it seems to me that he had the 
necessary reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused,”  said the judge. The evidence obtained 
from the vehicle search was admitted and the 
accused was convicted of possessing marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in ruling her warrantless 
arrest lawful and, therefore, the 
search of the vehicle she was driving was 
unreasonable. In her view, the grounds relied on by 
the arresting officer were problematic. She said she 
was unknown to the police  and her vehicle was not 
associated with criminal activity. Nor had the 
reliability of the information from police and the 
confidential informer been established. Just 
because  she was seen loading and unloading 
garbage bags on a single occasion was not enough 
to raise the officer’s suspicions to reasonable 
grounds. And, even though the officer may have 
held a subjective belief, the grounds were not 
objectively reasonable. The information relied upon 
was unsubstantiated, equivocal or insubstantial. 
Furthermore, she submitted that the evidence ought 
to have been ruled inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
Arrest
Justice Butler, authoring the Court of Appeal 
decision, first noted the police power of arrest. 
“Pursuant to s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code ..., 
a peace officer is authorized to arrest without 
warrant ‘a  person who … on reasonable grounds, 
[the officer] believes has committed or is about to 
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commit an indictable  offence’,” he said. “For a 
warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting 
officer must subjectively believe that he  or she has 
the requisite reasonable grounds for arrest and 
those grounds must be objectively justifiable.” 
Here, the judge  found the officer had the necessary 
subjective belief that the bags loaded into the gold 
Honda contained marihuana. As for whether the 
grounds were objectively reasonable, the evidence 
must be viewed cumulatively through the lens of 
the officer’s considerable experience. In this case, 
Justice Butler found the officer’s subjective belief 
was objectively justified even though no single 
piece of information was compelling. For example, 
the historical information was very dated and the 
recent information was general. There was no 
information to establish the credibility of the 
informer, and there could be many innocent 
explanations for loading and unloading garbage 
bags. These concerns, however, were compensated 
by the totality  of the circumstances including the 
man’s long history of involvement in the  drug trade, 
his counter-surveillance measures when followed, 
the comings and goings of people to the home, and 
the observations of the man and the accused 
loading large garbage bags into the gold Honda:
I am of the view that the information available 
to [the officer] including the observations of the 
[man’s] residence culminating with the loading 
of the garbage bags provided grounds for arrest 
sufficient to meet this standard. As the decisions 
of this Court have frequently emphasized, the 
objective reasonableness of the grounds must 
be viewed through the perspective of a 
reasonable person standing in the officer’s 
shoes. Further, the pieces of evidence relied on 
to establish the grounds should not be 
examined in isolation. [references omitted, 
para. 42]
The trial judge did not err in concluding that the 
officer’s subjective belief in grounds for arrest were 
objectively reasonable. Thus, the  search of the gold 
Honda incidental to the arrest did not breach the 
accused’s Charter rights. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
SAFETY SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
DETENTION ONLY REQUIRES 
REASONABLE SUSPICION
R. v. Webber, 2019 BCCA 208
During daytime hours in July 2016, 
two patrol officers driving an 
unmarked police vehicle saw a car 
being driven in an erratic manner. The 
car’s driver made quick  turns in a 
pedestrian-heavy area and drove through a 
controlled intersection without stopping, contrary 
to British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA). The 
police activated their lights and siren and the car 
stopped abruptly, causing the driver to jerk forward 
and backward. The officers saw the driver lean 
towards the front centre console  of the car and 
make a motion with his right arm.
The officers conducted a records search of the 
licence plate, which revealed the car was registered 
to a “Jason Webber” and had been involved in an 
attempted murder investigation in October 2015. 
The officers approached the driver and asked him 
to step out of the vehicle. The accused was shaking 
and seemed excited. And the vehicle was strewn 
with empty cans and bottles, two cell phone 
chargers, a cell phone, various fast food wrappers 
and half a dozen five-hour energy drinks. 
After the  accused stepped out of the car he was 
patted down but no weapons were found. The 
accused remained by the curb with one officer, 
while the second officer returned to his vehicle and 
conducted a second police records check in the 
name of the accused, now known as “Mark 
Webber”. This records check revealed that: (1) the 
accused was prohibited from possessing firearms 
due to a prior extortion conviction; (2) he had been 
one of two intended victims of the attempted 
murder associated with the vehicle; (3) the second 
intended victim was the subject of a drug trafficking 
investigation; and (4) the suspect in the attempted 
murder was also associated with drug trafficking. 
The officer then conducted a safety  search of the 
centre console of the vehicle. As a result, he saw 
several small bags that appeared to contain 
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cocaine. The officer stopped his search, 
arrested the accused, returned to the 
vehicle and conducted a more  thorough 
search as an incident to arrest. The police 
seized about 83 grams of cocaine and 
nine grams of MDMA (ecstasy) from the 
vehicle that was packaged in various 
p l a s t i c b a g s . Th e a c c u s e d wa s 
subsequently charged with two counts of 
possessing drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking.  
British Columbia Provincial Court
One officer described the accused’s 
motion as a stuffing and pulling motion 
and that the items seen in the  car were 
consistent with cars involved in drug 
trafficking. The other officer described the accused’s 
motion as a stuffing motion or a motion where the 
driver was putting something in the centre console. 
Both officers testified they were concerned that the 
driver was pulling out or concealing something in 
the centre console, possibly a weapon. As for the 
additional information revealed during the second 
police records check, an officer said it elevated his 
concern that a  weapon may be  concealed in the 
front centre console. In the officer’s view, the 
weapons prohibition suggested the accused had 
used weapons in the past. As well, the links 
between the accused and the drug trade elevated 
his safety concerns as the officer was aware of 
frequent violence in the Vancouver drug trade. 
Among other things, the accused argued that his 
rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10 of the Charter had been 
breached. He contended that there was no legal 
basis for his initial detention, the  pat-down search 
or the search of the  car’s console. Furthermore, he 
suggested that he was not informed of the reason 
for his detention and was not adequately apprised 
of his right to counsel. In his view, the evidence 
obtained from the  search of the console should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
The judge found the initial detention of the accused 
lawful.  Because he failed to stop at a controlled 
intersection and because of his erratic driving, the 
police had a legal right to detain the accused. 
Moreover, the fact the police issued no ticket did 
not render the detention improper. The accused 
also had been informed of the reasons for his 
detention — erratic driving and failing to stop. The 
judge also ruled that s. 10(b) was not triggered 
during a traffic stop for driving offences.  
As for the pat-down search and the console search, 
the officer subjectively believed they were both 
necessary  to ensure no weapon was present. The 
judge also held both searches were objectively 
reasonable. The judge accepted the officer’s 
evidence that he conducted the pat-down search 
due to a concern over concealed weapons. In 
applying a reasonable suspicion standard for the 
safety searches, he found that “reasonable grounds 
existed to conduct a safety search of both [the 
accused] and the centre console area of the 
vehicle” when the accused was first detained and 
the initial police records check was made. In other 
words, the reasons for both the pat-down and 
console search were the same. As for the second 
police records check, it only served to “bolster” the 
initial grounds and provide additional facts to 
support the console search. “I’am of the view that 
the stated grounds for searching both [the 
accused] and the vehicle prior to receiving the 
information from the second records check were 
objectively reasonable,” said the judge. “The 
second police records check  only served to 
reinforce those grounds.”
The judge also held that safety searches may 
legitimately attend investigations of MVA violations 
and need not be confined to the person. The search 
of the console was part of the safety search and this 
search only became a drug investigation when the 
drugs were discovered. Both the  pat-down search 
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure.
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and console search were minimally  intrusive, and 
the console search was limited to the  area  of the 
pulling or stuffing motion. Further, the time 
between the initial detention and the discovery of 
the drugs was short, no more than 10 minutes. 
Since there were no Charter breaches, there  was no 
reason to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2). The 
accused was convicted on both charges. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused accepted that his 
initial detention and the 
pat-down search of his body 
were lawful, but asserted that 
the trial judge erred in concluding that the console 
search did not breach s. 8 of the Charter. In his 
view, among other things, the trial judge 
improperly relied upon the  officer’s evidence that a 
safety search of the centre  console was necessary. 
Moreover, he contended that the trial judge erred in 
law by applying the  “reasonable suspicion” 
standard rather than the  “reasonable grounds to 
believe”  standard for determining the scope and 
necessity  of the safety search. He also suggested the 
trial judge erred by finding his detention during the 
console search was lawful pursuant to an 
investigation under the MVA. He suggested that the 
evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2).
In his opening paragraph of the Appeal Court’s 
opinion, Justice Savage, speaking for the 
unanimous panel, stated:
The fundamental duty of the police is to protect 
life and safety. In the course of this duty, police 
officers put their lives and safety at risk in order 
to preserve and protect the lives and safety of 
others. On occasion, in furtherance of this duty, 
a citizen’s liberty will be interfered with. 
Sometimes, when it is reasonably necessary in 
the circumstances, the police are authorized to 
conduct a limited search for the purpose of 
ensuring their own and the public’s safety. 
[para. 1]
Safety Search: Reasonable Suspicion or 
Reasonable Grounds to Believe Standard
After reviewing case law, Justice  Savage concluded 
that the appropriate standard for a police safety 
search incidental to investigative detention is 
“reasonable suspicion”. He noted the judicial 
debate that has emerged from the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 
3, and whether that case changed the requisite 
legal threshold for lawful police safety searches 
from the “reasonable suspicion” standard to the 
higher standard of “reasonable grounds to 
believe”. In his view, the legal standard for a  safety 
search was not elevated by MacDonald. “In my 
opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada did not 
recalibrate the test for lawful police safety 
searches from the traditional ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ standard,”  he said. The judge did not err 
in concluding that the reasonable suspicion 
standard applied in determining whether a limited 
safety search was reasonably necessary. 
The Console Search
The accused conceded that his pat-down search 
was lawfully conducted as incident to his 
investigative detention. Thus, as the Court of Appeal 
noted, the  accused “must be taken to accept that 
there were reasonable grounds (on the elevated 
standard) to believe the pat-down search for 
weapons was justified.” Because the trial judge 
concluded that both safety searches were justified 
“The fundamental duty of the police is to protect life and safety.  In the course of this 
duty, police officers put their lives and safety at risk in order to preserve and protect the 
lives and safety of others. On occasion, in furtherance of this duty, a citizen’s liberty will 
be interfered with. Sometimes, when it is reasonably necessary in the circumstances, the 
police are authorized to conduct a limited search for the purpose of ensuring their own 
and the public’s safety.”
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on the basis of the  grounds acquired during the 
initial detention and the first police records check, 
any concern about the trial judge’s characterization 
concerning  the information learned during the 
second police records check would not have 
affected his reasoning and was not material to the 
outcome. And the Appeal Court too found there 
was no error in the trial “judge accepting the police 
officers’ evidence, including their evidence about 
their safety concerns arising from both what they 
observed and their knowledge of the local 
circumstances.”  Justice Savage held the “the 
officers’ subjective concerns were objectively 
reasonable”  and “both officers had observed the 
pulling or stuffing motion, which was not related 
to procuring a driver’s licence arising from the 
stop.”
Detention During Console Search
The accused’s argument that the police did not 
continue to have the authority to detain him and 
conduct a safety search of the centre console after 
they had decided not to issue him a  ticket for 
contravening the MVA before conducting the 
console search was rejected. “In my view, the 
continued detention and search of [the accused’s] 
vehicle after the officers decided not to issue a 
ticket under the Motor Vehicle  Act was authorized 
by law,” said Justice Savage. “Police have the 
authority to detain individuals and conduct 
searches to prevent avoidable harm through brief 
and minimally intrusive searches, which are not 
necessarily restricted to physical pat-downs. The 
powers of investigative detention and search 
incident thereto are lawfully exercised where the 
police  have reasonable grounds to suspect it is 
necessary to ensure safety, even if the reason for 
the initial stop is not a crime. The authorization to 
conduct a brief, focused protective search, as was 
done here, does not end at the point in time that 
charging decisions are being considered or made.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from the trial 
judge’s ruling, File No: 233739-1, November 22, 
2017, unreported.
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL
Sunday, September 29, 2019 
BC Legislature
Victoria, British Columbia
CANADIAN POLICE 
& PEACE OFFICER 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Sunday, September 29, 2019 
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
“Police have the authority to detain individuals and conduct searches to prevent 
avoidable harm through brief and minimally intrusive searches, which are not necessarily 
restricted to physical pat‑downs. The powers of investigative detention and search 
incident thereto are lawfully exercised where the police have reasonable grounds to 
suspect it is necessary to ensure safety, even if the reason for the initial stop is not a 
crime. The authorization to conduct a brief, focused protective search, as was done here, 
does not end at the point in time that charging decisions are being considered or made.”
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PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA 
ANNOUNCES ‘MEMORIAL 
GRANT PROGRAM’ FOR FIRST 
RESPONDERS
Public Safety Canada’s Memorial Grant Program for 
First Responders will provide a one-time lump sum, 
tax free maximum payment of $300,000 to the 
families of first responders who have died as a 
result of their duties.
According to its website, “the  Memorial Grant is a 
non-economic benefit and does not compensate 
families of first responders for monetary  loss 
(income replacement) or serve as life insurance, 
but rather, is in recognition of their service and 
sacrifice.”
FAQs
What is the effective date for eligibility?
The effective date for the Memorial Grant Program 
for First Responders is April 1, 2018. For eligibility, 
the date of death must be on or after April 1, 2018. 
The Grant will not be retroactive. You may apply  for 
the Memorial Grant any time after the  date of 
death.
Who qualifies as a First Responder?
Qualifying First Responders include:
• Police officers
• Firefighters
• Paramedics
To qualify as a  first responder, an individual must 
be employed or formally engaged to carry out the 
duties by a  Canadian emergency service in Canada 
in the above mentioned groups. This includes all 
volunteers, auxiliary, reservists and cross-trained 
personnel.
First responders could have worked for a province 
or territory, a municipality, a  district or region, an 
indigenous emergency service or the federal 
government.
Who is eligible for the Memorial Grant Program 
for First Responders?
Families of first responders who die as a result of 
their duties are  eligible to receive a one-time lump-
sum direct payment of $300,000, based upon the 
following order of priority:
• The spouse or common law partner; or
• If there is no surviving spouse or common law 
partner, to a  surviving child or children 
divided in equal amounts; or
• If there is no surviving child, to a surviving 
parent or parents divided in equal amounts; or
• If there is no surviving parent, to surviving 
brothers and sisters divided in equal amounts; 
or
• If there are no surviving brothers and sisters, to 
the deceased's estate.
What is a line of duty death?
Line of duty deaths includes any death attributable 
to, and resulting from, the performance of official 
duties in the following circumstances:
• Death resulting from a fatal injury (e.g., 
gunshot wound, stabbing, car accident, etc.) 
while actively engaged in the duties of a first 
responder in Canada.
• Death resulting  from an occupational illness 
primarily  resulting  from employment as a first 
responder (e.g., lung cancer, leukemia, non-
Hodgkin's Lymphoma, heart injury or other 
illness).
• Death resulting from, or reasonably attributable 
to, psychological impairment, specifically 
suicide, based on a pre-existing diagnosis or 
other evidence of an operational stress injury.
“When firefighters, police officers and paramedics put their safety on the 
line, they are acting in service to all Canadians.” 
-Memorial Grant Program for First Responders-
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2019 BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Parade participants to form up at 12:00 noon in the 
800 block of Government Street, Victoria, BC.
Parade will step off at 12:40 pm
OTHER WEEKEND EVENTS
6TH ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL GOLF TOURNAMENT
Date: Friday, September 27, 2019
Format: Texas Scramble
Time: 11:00 am Registration / 1:00 pm Shotgun Start
Location: Bear Mountain Golf & Country Club, 1999 Country Club Way, Victoria, BC
6TH ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL RIDE TO 
REMEMBER
Date: Saturday. September 28, 2019
1ST ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL RUN TO 
REMEMBER
Date: Saturday. September 28, 2019
BCLEM MEET & GREET
Date: Saturday. September 28, 2019
click here for more info
Sunday, September 29, 2019 at 1:00 pm 
BC Legislature, Victoria, BC
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... F350 SD 4WD 
PU was the top 
vehicle stolen in 
Canada in 2018 according  to the Insurance Bureau 
of Canada. Their annual list of the Top 10 Stolen 
Vehicles in Canada is based 
on actual insurance claims 
data collected from nearly 
all automobile insurance 
companies in Canada.
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, “Top 
10 Stolen Vehicles”, accessed on June 22, 2019. 
POLICE OFFICER RANKED 14th 
BEST JOB IN CANADA 
Canadian Business has ranked the job of Police 
Officer as the 14th best of 100 jobs in Canada. 
Nurse  practitioner was ranked #1. Other jobs and 
their ranking included:
• Conservation Officer - 29
• Firefighter - 72
• Lawyer - 75
• Probation & Parole Officer - 86
• Paramedic - 90
‘AGGRESSIVE’ POLICE 
CONDUCT AMOUNTED TO 
ARBITRARY DETENTION: 
HANDGUN & DRUGS EXCLUDED
R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34
At about 10:40 p.m. a police officer 
patrolling a housing cooperative 
spoke with two security guards 
responsible for overall security at 
the complex. The officer asked 
about a specific  individual and showed the  security 
guards a picture of him. The security guards said 
they had not seen the person, but volunteered 
information about another unrelated individual 
who was seen at the back of townhouse. The 
security guards described the townhouse as a 
“problem address” associated with drugs trafficking 
in the backyard. Two other police officers arrived 
towards the end of the conversation with the 
security guards.
After speaking to the security guards, the police 
decided to walk through the complex to the area 
behind the  townhouse that the guards had 
identified. The backyard was surrounded by a waist-
high wooden fence with an opening. There  was no 
gate. The officers saw five young men, including the 
accused, simply talking. They were not doing 
anything wrong. 
Two officers walked through the fence opening into 
the backyard. Neither officer asked permission to 
enter or said anything to the young men before 
doing so. A third officer patrolled along the fence 
and then jumped over the fence to enter the 
backyard. Police asked the men, “what was going 
on, who they were, and whether any of them lived 
there.” Each of the men were asked to produce 
identification.  
When officers saw one of the men on a  couch with 
his hands behind his back they told him to keep his 
hands in front of him. The man complied. As police 
were identifying the men, an officer noticed that 
the accused had a satchel slung over his shoulder, 
looked nervous and “bladed” his body. An officer 
2007 Ford
Canada’s Top 10 Stolen Vehicles - 2018
Rank Vehicle
1 2007 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
2 2006 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
3 2005 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
4 2004 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
5 2003 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
6 2006 FORD F250 SD 4WD PU
7 2001 FORD F350 SD 4WD PU
8 2000 FORD F250 SD 4WD PU
9 2015 LEXUS GX460 4DR AWD SUV
10 2001 FORD F250 SD 4WD PU
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demanded identification 
from the accused but he said 
he didn’t have any. When the 
officer asked what was in the 
satchel, the accused fled. 
Police pursued, caught and 
arrested the accused on a 
nearby street. A search 
yielded a fully-loaded, .45 calibre semi-automatic 
Ruger pistol and a considerable amount of cash. At 
the police station the accused handed over 13 
grams of cocaine, The accused was charged with 
10 criminal offences including firearm and drug-
related crimes.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge ruled that the accused was 
not detained until the officer asked him 
what he had in the bag slung over his 
shoulder. Prior to this inquiry, no officer 
had restrained the accused or made any direction 
or demand to him, and he believed he was free to 
leave. At the point of the inquiry, however, the 
detention was lawful. The officer had reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the accused was armed. The 
accused was nervous, fidgety and he bladed his 
body away from the officer. The investigative 
detention was therefore justified.  
The judge went on to decide that, had there 
been  Charter  breaches, the evidence would 
nevertheless be admissible  under s. 24(2). He 
concluded that all three s. 24(2) factors - the 
seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state conduct, 
the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the 
accused and society's interest in an adjudication on 
the merits - favoured admission of the  evidence. 
The accused was convicted of several firearm and 
drug-related offences and sentenced to five years in 
prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that  police breached his s. 9 
Charter rights. But a majority of 
the Court of Appeal concluded 
the trial judge did not err in his findings. The 
accused’s own evidence, that he believed he was 
free to leave the backyard after police had entered 
and questioned the men, was an important 
consideration in determining whether he was 
detained. Moreover, the Appeal Court upheld the 
trial judge’s decision that the detention that did 
arise was not arbitrary. 
Finally, if there was a Charter breach, the evidence 
was admissible. First, any Charter-infringing state 
conduct was technical, inadvertent, and made in 
good faith. Second, the impact of any breach on 
the accused’s Charter-protected liberty interest was 
momentary and minimal. Finally, society's interest 
in an adjudication on the merits favoured 
admission as the evidence was highly reliable and 
the crimes very serious.
Justice Lauwers, in dissent, disagreed with the 
majority’s analysis and would have excluded the 
evidence. In his view, the accused was detained at 
the moment the police entered the backyard. They 
were uninvited, did not have permission to enter 
nor grounds to get a  warrant. They also created a 
physical barrier by blocking the exit and an 
atmosphere through questioning that would lead a 
reasonable person in the accused’s position to 
believe that he had no choice but to comply with 
the police  demands. As well, the accused was 
young, a  minority and comparatively small in 
stature. As for s. 24(2), despite the reliability  of the 
evidence and its importance to the Crown’s case, 
The Charges
• possessing a firearm without a licence; 
• possessing a firearm knowing he was not the 
holder of a licence; 
• possessing a loaded firearm without having an 
authorization, licence, or registration certificate; 
• careless storage of ammunition; 
• carrying a firearm in a careless manner; 
• breaching orders prohibiting him from possessing 
a firearm x 2; 
• possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking; 
• possessing cocaine; and 
• possessing proceeds of crime under $5,000
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the Charter breach was serious and its impact on 
the accused was significant. It’s admission would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing, among 
other things, that he was 
arbitrarily detained under s. 
9 of the Charter and the evidence ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2).
Justices Brown and Martin, authoring the opinion 
for a three member majority of the Supreme Court, 
first explained the protection afforded by s. 9:
 
Section 9’s prohibition of “arbitrary detention” 
is meant to protect individual liberty against 
unjustified state interference. Its protections 
limit the state’s ability to impose intimidating 
and coercive pressure on citizens without 
adequate justification ... [A] psychological 
detention by the police, such as the one 
claimed in this case, can arise in two ways: (1) 
the claimant is “legally required to comply with 
a direction or demand”  by the police (i.e. by 
due process of law); or (2) a claimant is not 
under a legal obligation to comply with a 
d i r e c t i o n o r d e m a n d , “ b u t a 
reasonable person in the subject’s 
position would feel so obligated” and 
would “conclude that he or she was 
not free to go”.
Even, therefore, absent a legal 
obligation to comply with a police 
demand or direction, and even absent 
physical restraint by the state, a 
detention exists in situations where a 
reasonable person in the accused’s 
shoes would feel obligated to comply with a 
police direction or demand and that they are 
not free to leave. Most citizens, after all, will 
not precisely know the limits of police authority 
and may, depending on the circumstances, 
perceive even a routine interaction with the 
police as demanding a sense of obligation to 
comply with every request.
Having said that, not every police-citizen 
interaction is a detention within the meaning of 
s. 9 of the Charter. A detention requires 
“significant physical or psychological restraint”. 
Even where a person under investigation for 
criminal activity is questioned, that person is 
not necessarily detained. While “[m]any 
[police-citizen encounters] are relatively 
innocuous, ... involving nothing more than 
passing conversation[,] [s]uch exchanges [may] 
become more invasive ... when consent and 
conversation are replaced by coercion and 
interrogation”. In determining when this line is 
crossed (i.e. the point of detention, for the 
purposes of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter), it is 
essential to consider all of the circumstances of 
the police encounter. Section 9 requires an 
assessment of the encounter as a whole and not 
a frame-by-frame dissection as the encounter 
unfolds. [references omitted, paras. 25-27]
Charter of Rights
s. 9 Everyone has the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned.
“Even, therefore, absent a legal obligation to comply with a police demand or direction, 
and even absent physical restraint by the state, a detention exists in situations where a 
reasonable person in the accused’s shoes would feel obligated to comply with a police 
direction or demand and that they are not free to leave. Most citizens, after all, will not 
precisely know the limits of police authority and may, depending on the circumstances, 
perceive even a routine interaction with the police as demanding a sense of obligation to 
comply with every request.”
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Here, the young men were not legally  required to 
answer the questions posed by the police, produce 
their identification, or follow directions about 
where  they could place their hands. Thus, any 
analysis needed to focus on whether a reasonable 
person, standing in the  accused’s position, would 
have felt obligated to comply and would not have 
felt free to leave as the police entered the  backyard 
and made contact with them.
The majority found a detention crystallized before 
the accused was asked what was in his satchel. In 
their view, the accused was detained when the 
police entered the backyard and made contact with 
him. In finding a detention at this point, the 
majority’s considerations included the following:
• Circumstances of the encounter: The police 
entered a private backyard without a warrant, 
consent or warning. They immediately started 
questioning the young men about who they 
were and what they were doing, demanded 
identification and issued instructions. 
• Nature of Police Conduct: The police were 
trespassing in the backyard of a  private 
residence late at night. Two officers entered 
through an opening while a third entered over 
the fence, suggesting a  tactical element to the 
encounter. The young men were questioned, 
asked for identification and one was told to 
keep his hands visible. One officer said 
another yelled this command and the young 
man complied. Furthermore, the police 
positioned themselves in a manner that 
blocked the exit from the backyard and their 
physical proximity in the small space would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the 
police were taking control and it was 
impossible to leave. The presence of others in 
the backyard would likely increase a 
perception of detention because a reasonable 
person would see how the others were treated 
and think they had to remain and obey police. 
Finally, even though the interaction lasted less 
than a minute, the majority described the 
police conduct that occurred within this short 
period of time as “aggressive”.
• Particular Characteristics or Circumstances of 
the Accused: The accused was 20 years old, of 
Asian decent (a  racialized community), of 
small stature and had prior street level 
interactions with the police. His personal view 
that he felt free to leave the backyard was not 
determinative of the detention question 
because  the test is objective in nature. “The 
focus of the s. 9 analysis should not, therefore, 
be on what was in the accused’s mind at a 
particular moment in time, but rather on how 
the police behaved and, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, how such 
behavior would be reasonably perceived,”  said 
the majority. “To find otherwise puts the onus 
on the claimant to gauge correctly when they 
are detained and when they are not.”
No statute authorized the  police to detain anyone 
in the backyard nor did the common law power to 
detain for investigative purposes. When police 
entered the backyard, they had no information 
linking any of its yet to be identified occupants to 
any criminal conduct or suspected criminal 
conduct. “[The accused’s] detention was arbitrary 
because, at the time of detention (when the  police 
entered the backyard), the  police  had no 
reasonable suspicion of recent or ongoing criminal 
activity,”  said the majority. “Investigative  objectives 
that are not grounded in reasonable suspicion do 
not support the lawfulness of a detention, and 
cannot therefore be viewed as legitimate in the 
context of a s. 9 claim.” Since there  was no 
statutory or common law power that authorized the 
detention at the  point the police entered the 
backyard, it was arbitrary. 
Exclusion of the Evidence
The majority concluded that the admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. Although the criminal offences were 
serious and the evidence highly reliable, the police 
misconduct was serious and had a significant 
impact upon the accused’s liberty. Both of these 
factors favoured a finding that the  admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute:
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The police crossed a bright line when, without 
permission or reasonable grounds, they entered 
into a private backyard whose occupants were 
“just talking” and “doing nothing wrong”. The 
police requested identification, told one of the 
occupants to keep his hands visible and asked 
pointed questions about who they were, where 
they lived, and what they were doing in the 
backyard. This is precisely the sort of police 
conduct that the Charter was intended to 
abolish. Admission of the fruits of that conduct 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. This Court has long recognized that, 
as a general principle, the end does not justify 
the means. The evidence must be excluded. 
[reference omitted, para. 160]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
was excluded, his convictions were set aside, and 
acquittals were entered.
 
A Different View
Justice Moldaver, speaking for himself 
and the Chief Justice, disagreed that 
the accused was detained at the 
moment the police entered the 
backyard. He stated:
While it can be difficult to ascertain with any 
degree of certainty the point at which a 
psychological detention occurred, I am 
prepared to find that [the accused] was 
detained, at the earliest, when the third officer 
entered the backyard and directed one of the 
young men to keep his hands in front of him, 
an order which he complied with immediately. 
In all the circumstances, upon seeing this clear 
exercise of police authority and his friend’s 
immediate compliance, it is realistic to 
conclude that a reasonable person in [the 
accused’s] ci rcumstances would have 
considered himself effectively deprived of his 
liberty of choice — even though [the accused] 
did not consider himself to be detained at this 
point. [para. 276]
Despite a  finding that the  detention occurred later 
in the encounter, the  minority nevertheless found it 
arbitrary. “At the moment when [the accused] was 
detained, the police had not yet developed 
reasonable grounds to suspect he was armed — a 
prerequisite  to a  lawful investigative detention,” 
said Justice Moldaver. “That said, the arbitrary 
detention was momentary, lasting mere seconds 
before  the police developed reasonable grounds to 
suspect [the accused] was armed, thereby 
transforming the arbitrary detention into a lawful 
one.” 
Admissibility of the Evidence
Despite finding an arbitrary detention, the minority 
would admit the evidence. The police conduct sat 
on the less serious end of the spectrum and its 
impact on the Charter protected interests of the 
accused was not so great as to overwhelm other 
considerations. As well, the evidence was real, 
reliable  and essential to he prosecution of very 
serious criminal offences. “In my view, reasonable 
and well-informed members of the public would 
regard a decision in this case to exclude the 
evidence and exonerate an admitted drug dealer 
who was prepared to reach for a loaded weapon 
during a violent struggle with the police as not 
merely alarming, but intolerable,”  said Justice 
Moldaver. “Our society — which is what s. 24(2), 
this Court, and the justice system as a whole are 
each meant to serve — deserves better.”  The 
minority would have dismissed the  accused’s 
appeal. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s Note: At the trial and Ontario Court of 
Appeal much was said about the  police entering 
the backyard and the application fo s. 8 of the 
Charter. The majority of the  Supreme Court of 
Canada was content with disposing of the appeal 
on the ss. 9 and 24(2) issues
“This Court has long recognized that, as a general principle, 
the end does not justify the means.”
Volume 19 Issue 3 ~ May/June 2019
PAGE 25
‘SAFETY SEARCH’ OF VEHICLE  
REQUIRES SERIOUS SAFETY 
CONCERNS 
R. v. Del Corro, 2019 ABCA 156
Police began investigating a suspect 
for illegal firearms trafficking and put 
him under physical surveillance. After 
learning that the suspect had 
obtained an authorization to transport 
a new firearm, police observed him interact 
through his car window with the accused at a gas 
station. The accused was driving a black Mercedes. 
At the time, the lead investigator did not believe 
this interaction was a firearm transaction, although 
he thought it might have been a drug deal.
The next day, the suspect picked up the new 
firearm. Police surveillance lost sight of him but 
later the same day he was seen to briefly meet with 
the accused again. The accused entered the 
backseat of the suspect’s vehicle for about two 
minutes and then left. Nothing was seen exchanged 
between the two men and the accused did not 
appear to be carrying anything in his hands when 
he left. Nevertheless, the lead investigator believed 
that the suspect had delivered a firearm to the 
accused and that their meeting the day before had 
been for payment.
Over the next several weeks, the police did not 
obtain any more information linking the accused to 
the suspect or firearms. They  tried to arrange 
surveillance but had difficulty locating  him. A 
couple of weeks later they did locate him but his 
activities that day were more consistent with drug 
trafficking than firearms trafficking. The police also 
determined that the accused did not have a licence 
to possess firearms. Sometime later, the police 
received information that the suspect was buying 
another firearm and had received an authorization 
to transport. The day after picking up the firearm, 
the accused arrived at the suspect’s home in the 
Mercedes. The suspect, who was empty-handed, 
entered the vehicle and the two men drove around 
to the alley at the back. At the same time, the 
suspect’s roommate arrived at the back of the 
residence in a  truck and exited his vehicle. A brief 
discussion between the three men ensued. After 
that, the suspect walked back to his residence, 
followed by the roommate. The roommate returned 
to the Mercedes to speak with the accused and 
then returned to the house. The police  could not 
see what transpired inside the accused’s vehicle 
and did not observe any of the participants 
exchanging anything. The accused then drove away. 
The lead investigator believed he now had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused for unlawful possession of a firearm. He 
believed that the suspect had delivered a firearm to 
the accused during the meeting that had just been 
observed. The  lead investigator instructed the 
tactical team to arrest the accused. He also 
temporarily  suspended the accused’s right to 
counsel to permit the execution of a general search 
warrant at the suspect’s residence.
Police conducted a pat-down search of the accused 
incident to arrest and also searched the interior of 
the Mercedes. No firearms were found but police 
located cocaine, oxycodone and related 
paraphernalia inside a jacket on the front seat and 
inside a satchel belonging to the accused on the 
floor of the back passenger seat. He was re-arrested 
for possessing controlled substances for the 
purpose of trafficking. A search of the suspect’s 
residence resulted in both firearms that the 
investigator thought had been sold to the accused 
being found. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued that the police 
lacked reasonable and probable grounds 
to arrest him for unlawful possession of a 
firearm and therefore breached his ss. 8 
and 9 rights not to be subjected to an unreasonable 
search or arbitrary detention.The judge found the 
lead investigator subjectively believed that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused for possessing restricted firearms but 
concluded his belief was not objectively 
reasonable, having regard to the information 
known to him in light of his training and 
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experience. The information was consistent with 
too many other possibilities that were innocuous or 
related to different criminal activity. Since the arrest 
was without lawful authority, it breached s. 9 of the 
Charter. The search of the accused’s person and his 
vehicle was unreasonable under s. 8 because it was 
not authorized by the  common law power of search 
incident to arrest, the arrest having been unlawful.
Despite identifying the ss. 8 and 9 breaches, the 
judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Although the lead investigator did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused for illegal possession of a firearm, the 
judge found he had grounds to investigatively 
detain the accused for the same offence. The officer 
then could have conducted a “safety search” of 
both the accused’s person and vehicle for weapons 
“incident to investigative detention” and would 
have found the drugs anyway. In other words, the 
police had a constitutionally permissible way to 
obtain the  drugs without breaching the accused’s 
Charter rights. 
The judge found the breaches were not egregious 
and the  impact of the breaches on the accused 
were at the “lower end of the spectrum”. And, 
finally, the charges were serious, the evidence was 
highly reliable and crucial to the Crown’s case. 
Further, the drugs could have been discovered 
lawfully by a “safety search” incident to an 
investigative detention. Admitting the evidence 
obtained through the Charter breaches would not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The accused then pled guilty to possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking and simple  possession 
of oxycodone. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in finding that the lead 
i n v e s t i g a t o r c o u l d h av e 
investigatively detained him for unlawful 
possession of a firearm and therefore could have 
lawfully conducted a “safety  search”  of the vehicle 
for weapons incident to the investigative detention. 
In addition, these two errors undermined the  trial 
judge’s decision to admit the  evidence. Thus, the 
accused argued the drugs should have been 
excluded. 
The Investigative Detention
A majority  of the Court of Appeal described the 
police power to detain for investigative purposes:
Police have the power to detain a suspect 
under the common law power of investigative 
detention if they reasonably suspect that the 
suspect is committing, or has recently 
committed a crime. The reasonableness of the 
suspicion must be assessed on an objective 
view of the totality of the circumstances. The 
reasonable suspicion test is a low threshold, 
since the officer’s information need only 
objectively indicate a possibility that a suspect 
is committing a crime, not a probability. 
[references omitted, para. 44]
Since the bar for reasonable suspicion is low, the 
majority found the information known to the lead 
investigator at the time of arrest provided a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was 
unlawfully possessing a  firearm. Thus, the trial 
judge’s opinion that the lead investigator was 
entitled to investigatively detain the accused at the 
time of the arrest was correct.    
“Police have the power to detain a 
suspect under the common law power of 
investigative detention if they reasonably 
suspect that the suspect is committing, or 
has recently committed a crime. The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be 
assessed on an objective view of the 
totality of the circumstances. The 
reasonable suspicion test is a low 
threshold, since the officer’s information 
need only objectively indicate a 
possibility that a suspect is committing a 
crime, not a probability.”
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The Safety Search of the Vehicle
 
“There is no general power of search ‘incident to 
investigative detention’, unlike the power of search 
incident to arrest,” said the majority. “That means 
that any search following an investigative 
detention must be independently justified and 
does not follow as a matter of course or as 
‘incidental’ to the detention.”  The majority noted 
there  is “a limited power to conduct a  pat-down 
search following an investigative detention if the 
officer has a  reasonable belief that officer or 
public safety is at risk”, but that “the exact limits 
of safety searches incident to investigative 
detention are unclear.” And although some 
appellate courts have extended safety searches to 
vehicles and backpacks, “in every case where a 
search extends beyond a pat-down, the 
circumstances must disclose serious safety 
concerns requiring something more than a pat-
down.” 
In this case, the majority concluded that the lead 
investigator could not have lawfully performed a 
safety search of the vehicle and its contents:
• The subjective component of the test was 
not met. “The evidence does not support a 
finding that [the lead investigator] believed 
that safety was at stake, necessitating a search 
of the vehicle and its contents to remove the 
threat,”  said the majority. Rather, the evidence 
was clear that the focus of police was to gather 
evidence of suspected firearms trafficking. The 
lead investigator made no mention of officer 
safety or public safety. 
• The objective component of the test was not 
met. It was not reasonable  to believe, in the 
circumstances that existed, that there was an 
imminent threat to safety  and that a search was 
necessary  to eliminate the threat. Although 
firearms were the perceived threat and the lead 
investigator suspected that the accused had a 
firearm in his possession, the accused was out 
of the  vehicle, handcuffed, under the control of 
the tactical team, and no one else was in the 
vehicle. “Once officers found out that [the 
accused] did not have a firearm on his person 
and had handcuffed him, there was no further 
justification for searching the vehicle  for a 
firearm under the guise of a ‘safety search’,” 
said the majority. “Put simply, even if there 
was a firearm in the vehicle, there  was no way 
for [the accused] to access it. He posed no 
threat. ... Accordingly, a search of the vehicle 
and its contents to eliminate a threat posed by 
a firearm believed to be in the vehicle was not 
objectively justified.”
Since the requirements for a  safety search incident 
to investigative detention were not satisfied, the 
lead investigator could not have discovered the 
drugs in the vehicle lawfully. This error by  the trial 
judge improperly drove his s. 24(2) analysis.  
s. 24(2) Charter
In conducting a new s. 24(2) analysis, the majority 
excluded the evidence. While the breaches were 
not the most serious, they  were more than minor, 
technical or the result of an understandable 
mistake. This favoured exclusion. The arrest was a 
significant intrusion on the accused’s s. 9 Charter-
protected liberty interest, and the pat-down search 
modestly  interfered with his s. 8 Charter-protected 
privacy interest in his own body. The searches of the 
vehicle and its contents, including the jacket and 
satchel, were significant intrusions on his privacy 
“There is no general power of search ‘incident to investigative detention’, unlike the 
power of search incident to arrest. That means that any search following an investigative 
detention must be independently justified and does not follow as a matter of course or as 
‘incidental’ to the detention.”
“[I]n every case where a search extends 
beyond a pat-down, the circumstances 
must disclose serious safety concerns 
requiring something more than a pat-down.” 
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interests. This too favoured exclusion. And society’s 
interest in adjudicating  the case on its merits 
through the admission of the highly reliable drug 
evidence found in the vehicle that was essential to 
proving the Crown’s case for a serious offence did 
not overcome the Charter infringing conduct that 
significantly intruded on the  accused’s liberty and 
privacy interests.
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the drugs and 
related paraphernalia seized from the  vehicle were 
excluded from evidence, and the accused was 
acquitted on all counts. 
A Second Opinion
Justice Strekaf, in dissent, disagreed with 
the majority that the evidence ought to 
have been excluded. In her view, the 
admission of the evidence would not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
“This is a case where a police officer made a 
mistaken judgement call about whether he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to make an 
arrest, which the trial judge described as a close 
call committed in good faith, and where there was 
no deliberate, egregious, wilful or flagrant 
disregard of the rights of the accused,” said Justice 
Strekaf. “This is not a case where the Court needs 
to disassociate itself from the police  conduct. The 
impact of the Charter breach was significant, but 
not at the most serious end of the scale. The 
evidence was highly reliable and essential to a 
determination on the merits.”  She would therefore 
have dismissed the accused’s appeal.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
GENERAL SAFETY CONCERN 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY       
TWO MINUTE s. 10(b) DELAY
R. v. Todd, 2019 SKCA 36
At 11:22 p.m. a police officer 
clocked a truck on radar travelling 
west on Highway #1 at 143 km/h in a 
110 km/h speed zone. The officer 
turned on his emergency lights and 
the truck stopped without incident. The officer 
approached the driver’s side of the truck and made 
the following observations: 
• The accused had just lit a fresh cigarette; 
• He appeared to be more nervous than most 
individuals at a “routine” traffic stop; 
• His hand trembled when he handed over his 
driver’s licence;
• Several air fresheners were attached to the 
steering column of the truck; and 
• The truck, a rental vehicle, was equipped with 
a radar detection device. 
The officer, with 3.5 years on the job and 
experience with a large number of traffic stops and 
several CDSA investigations supplemented by a one 
week Pipeline Convoy Jetway Course, suspected 
illegal drugs were involved. He was aware that a 
freshly-lit cigarette and air fresheners are often used 
as masking  agents to hide the smell of drugs and he 
was doubtful a rental company would furnish its 
vehicle with a radar detector. In addition, the 
accused appeared more nervous than one might 
otherwise  expect for a  routine traffic  stop. In spite 
of his suspicion, the officer continued to treat the 
matter as a routine traffic stop. He took the 
accused’s licence and registration to his patrol car 
where he checked it through various police 
databases, but nothing of interest arose. 
The officer returned to the truck  at about 11:25 
p.m., warned the accused about speeding and told 
him he was “free to go”. He did this to to release 
the accused from psychological detention. The 
officer then purposefully turned away from the 
accused, took a few steps away from the truck, 
R. v. Todd, 2019 SKCA 36 timeline
Traffic Stop 11:22 p.m.
Accused Released 11:25 p.m.
Accused Detained for Investigation 11:28 p.m.
Accused Arrested 11:31 p.m.
Accused Provided s. 10(b) Warning 11:33 p.m.
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stopped, leaned back and then asked if the accused 
would mind the officer asking a few more questions 
before he left. The accused agreed and the officer 
proceeded to ask five or six questions.
The officer questioned the accused about the rental 
vehicle. The accused said he had hit a deer with his 
own vehicle, thus necessitating a rental that was 
equipped with a radar detector. The officer then 
asked about where the accused had been, how 
long he had been there, and why he only had one 
duffle bag for his trip. The officer thought the 
accused’s answers were odd and his nervousness 
appeared to elevate as their conversation 
continued. This interaction lasted two to three 
minutes and the officer believed he now had 
grounds to detain the accused for a drug 
investigation. These grounds were based on the 
officer’s earlier observations, the accused’s 
nervousness, his suspicious answers to the 
questions posed, and how he deflected some of the 
questions. At about 11:28 p.m., the  officer told the 
accused he was being detained for a drug 
investigation and instructed him to exit the vehicle 
and proceed to the patrol car. The officer asked the 
accused if he had anything in his pockets but did 
not conduct a pat-down safety search.  
The accused was initially compliant but became 
somewhat resistant and openly questioned the 
officer’s authority to detain him. The officer 
instructed the accused to enter the patrol car three 
times, with his last direction taking on a louder, 
more authoritarian tone. The accused relented and 
was placed in the back seat. When he asked the 
officer why he was being detained, he was again 
told it was related to drugs. The accused then asked 
the officer whether he  could leave if he let the 
officer look inside the duffle bag. The officer, 
interpreting the accused’s response as “pleading” 
and “bargaining”, combined with his heightened 
nervousness and panicked reaction believed he 
now had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused 
for possessing  a controlled substance. The officer 
arrested the accused at 11:31 p.m. and advised him 
of his right to counsel and gave the police caution 
at 11:33 p.m. A search of the truck incident to 
arrest resulted in cocaine, hash oil and bundles of 
cash totalling $22,000 being found. The accused 
was charged with possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.
 Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the officer had lawfully 
detained the accused for speeding. He 
also held, although it was “close to the 
line”, that the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion to detain him for a drug investigation 
based on (1) the freshly  lit cigarette and air 
fresheners; (2) the rental vehicle, (3) the radar 
detector, (4) the purpose of the trip seemed 
questionable, (5) minimal luggage for a two week 
trip and (6) the level of nervousness and continued 
nervousness.
The judge, however, concluded that the utterance 
the accused made in the back seat of the patrol car 
was not enough to move from reasonable suspicion 
for detention to reasonable grounds for arrest. In his 
view, the accused’s “bargaining” behaviour, along 
with the officer’s observations of him, fell short of 
establishing reasonable grounds for arrest. “I find 
that the accused has persuaded me, on a balance 
of probabilities, that when I take all of the 
accumulated observations of the constable, in 
their best light, and apply his level of training and 
experience, I do not find that I am able to 
conclude there are reasonable grounds for the 
arrest,”  said the judge. He found the officer acted 
too quickly and should have either summoned a 
sniffer dog, spoke further with the accused or 
conducted other investigation. “The power to 
arrest is only available when the officer 
subjectively believes he had reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrest,” continued 
the judge. “These grounds must be justified from 
an objective point of view, as assessed from the 
standpoint of the reasonable person. I do not see 
that here.”
Based on his findings, the judge ruled that the 
accused’s ss. 7,  8 and  9 Charter rights had been 
infringed, but he offered no opinion on whether 
there  had been a s. 10(b) breach. The judge then 
moved on to a s. 24(2) analysis and determined that 
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the evidence should be excluded. The officer knew 
the difference between reasonable suspicion to 
detain and reasonable  grounds to arrest. Although 
society had an interest in this case being 
adjudicated, the Charter  breaches were serious and 
they had a significant impact on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests. The accused was 
acquitted.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling arguing that he 
erred in concluding the arrest 
was unlawful and therefore the 
search of the truck  that followed was unreasonable. 
The Crown also asserted that even if there were 
Charter breaches, the evidence ought not to have 
been excluded. The accused contended that he had 
been detained at an earlier point in time and the 
police failed to respect his s. 10(b) right to counsel 
because they delayed advising him of it.
Lawful Arrest?
Justice Schwann, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, described the legal test for arrest as 
follows:
For an arrest to be lawful, two things must be 
established. First, the arresting officer must 
believe that he or she has reasonable grounds 
to make the arrest. ... Second, viewed 
objectively, the grounds articulated by the 
arresting officer must be reasonable; that is, a 
reviewing court must ask itself whether a 
person in the shoes of the officer would be able 
to conclude there were reasonable grounds for 
the arrest. [reference omitted, para. 25]
And further:
As a matter of established law, courts have 
consistently cautioned trial judges not to 
conflate reasonable grounds for arrest with the 
trial burden. While reasonable grounds for 
arrest contemplates something more than mere 
suspicion, the Crown does not need to meet the 
stringent “proof beyond reasonable doubt” 
standard, the lesser prima facie case standard 
or even the more relaxed civil “balance of 
probabilities” standard. ... [T]he “reasonable 
grounds to believe” standard is one of lesser 
probability, that is, the reviewing court must 
ask itself whether the inference drawn by the 
arresting officer was a reasonable one to have 
made at the time of arrest based on the 
circumstances known to the officer at that time. 
Determining whether reasonable grounds exist 
requires an assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances. [references omitted, para. 29]
Here, there was no issue taken with the officer’s 
subjective  belief. As for the objective test, the trial 
judge erred by focusing  on the  brevity  of the 
accused’s outburst in the patrol car, rather than 
what he said, how or why he said it, and what 
reasonable inference the officer could draw from 
the accused’s words and behaviour in light of the 
other observed indicia. The officer said the accused 
became panicky, attempted to bargain and acted 
like he  was trapped after being told he believed 
“For an arrest to be lawful, two things must be established. First, the arresting officer 
must believe that he or she has reasonable grounds to make the arrest. ... Second, 
viewed objectively, the grounds articulated by the arresting officer must be reasonable; 
that is, a reviewing court must ask itself whether a person in the shoes of the officer 
would be able to conclude there were reasonable grounds for the arrest.”
“While reasonable grounds for arrest 
contemplates something more than mere 
suspicion, the Crown does not need to meet 
the stringent ‘proof beyond reasonable 
doubt’ standard, the lesser prima facie case 
standard or even the more relaxed civil 
‘balance of probabilities’ standard.”
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there  were illicit drugs and contraband in the truck. 
The trial judge viewed the utterance in isolation 
from everything  that had transpired. “Simply 
focusing on the brevity of [the accused’s] 
comments to the exclusion of how he said them, 
the content of what was said and whether [the 
accused’s] utterance was reasonably connected to 
what [the officer] had just told him (i.e., that he 
was being detained for drugs) caused the trial 
judge to view the  utterance in isolation from 
everything that had transpired beforehand,” said 
Justice Schwann. “In my view, these  nuances 
should have been instrumental in assessing 
whether the inference of criminality drawn by [the 
officer] was a reasonable one for him to have 
made.” The officer did not move to arrest from his 
grounds for detention solely based on what the 
accused said. The Court of Appeal continued:
To tie all of this together, I am satisfied that the 
trial judge took a piecemeal approach to what 
[the accused] had said in the truck and, in 
doing so, failed to examine [the officer’s] 
evidence contextually and cumulatively. 
Furthermore, by focusing on the brevity of [the 
accused’s] utterance and [the officer’s] decision 
to divert from his original plan, the trial judge 
overemphasized these factors in seeming 
disregard for the continuum of events that had 
taken place and the observations that had been 
made by [the officer] up to the point in time 
when [the accused] was placed in the back seat 
of the patrol car. The Crown makes the point, 
with which I agree, that the additional 
observations made by [the officer] and, more 
importantly, [the accused’s] own conduct led 
seamlessly to the point where reasonable 
grounds for arrest were established. [The 
accused’s] arrest was unquestionably the 
culmination of a series of dynamic events that 
unfolded very rapidly. The trial judge was 
obliged to consider the full range of events in a 
cumulative, not piecemeal, fashion. Based on 
the trial judge’s written reasons, I am not 
satisfied he took that approach. [para. 44]
When Did Detention Arise?
The accused submitted that he was psychologically 
detained when he agreed to answer the officers 
questions even though he was told he was free to 
go. Therefore, he suggested he should have been 
advised of his s. 10(b) rights. Under cross-
examination the officer agreed he did not inform 
the accused that he had no obligation to answer the 
questions, had no legal authority  to detain him at 
that precise point in time, and considered his 
questioning to be a drug investigation. 
The Court of Appeal described a Charter detention 
as follows:
Detention is the suspension of an individual’s 
liberty interest. It can consist of either physical 
or psychological restraint, with psychological 
detention taking one of two forms. ... 
[P]sychological detention arises either where 
the individual has a legal obligation to comply 
with a restrictive request or demand, or where 
“a reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the state conduct that he or she had 
no choice but to comply”. [references omitted, 
para. 53] 
Justice Schwann also noted the following points 
established in the case law:
• Not every interaction between an individual 
and the police  is a  “detention” within the 
meaning of s. 9, even in circumstances where 
a person is under investigation for criminal 
activity. 
• Section 9 does not prohibit the police from 
interacting with members of the public until 
they have  specific grounds to connect the 
individual to the commission of a crime.
Detention is the suspension of an individual’s liberty interest. It can consist of either 
physical or psychological restraint, with psychological detention taking one of two 
forms. ... [P]sychological detention arises either where the individual has a legal obligation 
to comply with a restrictive request or demand, or where “a reasonable person would 
conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply”. 
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• While the police are not foreclosed from 
interacting with members of the public until 
such time as they have grounds to connect the 
individual with a  criminal offence, the issue 
often reduces to whether the individual in 
question was “psychologically” detained. 
• Focused suspicion, in and of itself, does not 
convert an interaction with police into a 
detention within the meaning of s. 9.
• There is no bright line separating innocuous 
police questioning from psychological 
detention.
• The onus is on the accused to show that, in the 
circumstances, they were effectively deprived 
of liberty of choice. 
• While it is not fatal for an accused to refrain 
from testifying about their perception of the 
police encounter, the accused’s contention that 
he or she had been deprived of liberty must 
nonetheless find support in the evidence.
Here, the accused did not testify. So, in determining 
whether a reasonable person in the accused’s 
circumstances would have  believed he had no 
choice but to remain at the scene and answer the 
questions put to him, the Court of Appeal 
considered the following:
• The circumstances giving rise to the 
encounter: The encounter started as a routine 
traffic stop for speeding. Although the officer 
did not specifically tell the accused the traffic 
detention was over, he did say he was free to 
go. The officer had returned the accused’s 
licence and registration and there was nothing 
physically blocking the accused’s  truck or 
inhibiting his exit from the scene. Nor did the 
officer shine a flashlight in the accused’s eyes, 
or encroach upon his personal space by 
leaning into the window or holding  on to the 
door.
• The nature of the police conduct: The 
accused was given the option to leave or 
remain at the scene to answer a few questions. 
The officer did not command the accused to 
stay or demand that he answer questions. The 
officer was professional. The questioning was 
of short duration –  two or three minutes at best 
– and the officer was not overbearing, and had 
not leaned into the truck or placed his hands 
on the window or door.
• The particular characterist ics or 
circumstances of the individual: Because 
the accused did not testify there was no 
evidence addressing these factors.
Since the accused failed to establish that he was 
psychologically detained during the brief 
interaction when he remained at the scene to 
answer the officer’s questions, there was no s. 9 
violation at this point. However, the accused was 
detained when the officer actually told him he was 
being detained for a drug investigation. But, at this 
point, the officer had the requisite suspicion to do 
so. 
s. 10(b) Charter
When the officer informed the accused that he was 
being detained, the accused’s s. 10(b) rights were 
engaged and he was entitled to be informed of his 
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 
The accused argued that if he had been provided 
with his right to counsel promptly and not minutes 
later, he  would not have blurted out the “duffle 
bag” comment that led to his arrest and, therefore, 
the search of his vehicle incident to arrest and the 
seizure of drugs and money would not have 
occurred.  
Justice Schwann noted that “even a short period of 
investigative detention does not suspend [the s. 
10(b)] Charter right.”  And the phrase “without 
delay” has been interpreted as immediately. 
However, absent public or officer safety concerns, 
generally there is no excuse that would justify a 
delay in informing the detainee of their right to 
counsel:
Officer or public safety concerns can give rise 
to some measure of delay; however, these 
concerns must be more than theoretical or 
general in nature in order to justify suspension 
of the right to counsel. That is to say, there must 
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be some concrete evidence put forth beyond 
the expression of an abstract concern. Whether 
there is a legitimate basis to suspend the right 
to counsel entails a fact-sensitive inquiry. [para. 
79]
In this case, the accused’s s. 10(b) rights were 
engaged at 11:28 p.m. when he was informed that 
he was detained for a drug investigation. He was 
therefore entitled to be informed of his right to 
counsel at this time unless it could be suspended 
on public or officer safety grounds. But here, there 
was no evidence of a legitimate safety concern that 
would excuse immediate compliance with s. 10(b):
Case law tells us that when a safety concern is 
advanced as the basis for suspending s.  10(b) 
rights, the arresting officer must provide an 
evidentiary basis for it. Considered in its 
entirety, I am not satisfied from the record that 
[the officer] believed [the accused] posed a 
danger to officer safety. There was no pat-down 
search; indeed, [the officer] felt there was no 
need to conduct one or to handcuff [the 
accused]. There was no evidence from the 
database search that [the accused] posed a 
threat of any sort. There was no evidence the 
integrity of the investigation could be 
jeopardized. While [the officer] expressed 
some concern about the danger of standing on 
the side of the highway at night, this concern 
was expressed in no more than a general or 
theoretical sort of way. In any event, to the 
extent there was a danger, it was ameliorated 
when [the officer] directed [the accused] to the 
passenger side of the patrol car. In my view, the 
real reason [the officer] delayed giving [the 
accused] his right to counsel was because, as 
he said several times in his testimony, he had a 
plan in mind that he felt would more effectively 
be executed in the patrol car.  
In my view, there was an insufficient 
evidentiary foundation on the voir dire to 
support the Crown’s assertion that immediate 
compliance with s. 10(b) was impossible or at 
least undesirable. As explained, there was a 
lack of a specific officer safety concern. There 
was no concern about the integrity of the 
investigation. While the time frame between 
when [the accused] was removed from the 
truck (11:28 p.m.) until the time he was given 
his right to counsel (11:33 p.m.) was brief, I am 
satisfied [the officer] could have advised [the 
accused] of his right to counsel at any point 
after he asked [the accused] to exit his truck, 
when he walked [the accused] toward the 
patrol car, when he asked [the accused] what 
he had in his pockets, or when [the accused] 
was placed in the patrol car. Even though this 
was a relatively fluid situation, based on the 
voir dire evidence and the absence of a specific 
safety concern, there was no reasonable basis 
for [the officer] to have delayed giving [the 
accused] his right to counsel. Accordingly, [the 
accused’s] right to be informed of his right to 
retain and instruct counsel was breached. 
[paras. 84-85]
Evidence Admission
Since the Appeal Court only found a s. 10(b) 
breach, it conducted a new s. 24(2) Charter 
enquiry. In doing so, the evidence was admitted:
In my view, the repute of the administration of 
justice would not be tarnished by the admission 
of the evidence in this case. The s. 10(b) breach 
was at the less-serious end of the spectrum. 
While Mr. Todd argues that had he been given 
his s. 10(b) right to counsel immediately upon 
detention, he would not have blurted out what 
he did in the back seat of the patrol car, his 
argument i s speculat ive and wi thout 
evidentiary foundation. This conclusion, 
combined wi th soc ie ty ’s in te res t s in 
adjudication on the merits, tips the scales in 
favour of admission of the evidence. [para. 
110]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“Case law tells us that when a safety concern is advanced as the basis for suspending 
s. 10(b) rights, the arresting officer must provide an evidentiary basis for it.”
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BC’s INTERMEDIATE WEAPON 
USE STATISTICS RELEASED
In February 2019 the Policing and Security Branch 
of BC’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General released the intermediate  weapon use and 
firearm discharge data reported by BC police 
agencies for 2017. 
The total number of Extended Range Impact 
Weapon (ERIW) discharges by police 
(number of subjects). This is up from 39 in 
2016 and 31 in 2015.
The total number of Conducted Energy 
Weapon (CEW) Discharges by police 
(number of subjects). This is up from 
222 in 2016 and 168 in 2015.
The total number of Oleoresin 
Capsicum (OC) Spray Discharges by 
police (number of subjects). This is up 
from 141 in 2016 and 193 in 2015.
The total number of Baton Applications by 
police (number of subjects).This is down 
from 92 in 2016 but up from 77 in 2015.
The total number of Firearm Discharge 
incidents by police  in an operational 
setting. This is up from nine (9) in 2016 and 
12 in 2015.
41
POLICE AGENCY - 2017 ERIW DISCHARGES
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
Vancouver 23
Abbotsford 7
Victoria 7
New Westminster 2
Delta 1
RCMP 1
89
POLICE AGENCY - 2017 BATON APPLICATIONS
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
Vancouver 48
RCMP 22
Abbotsford 7
West Vancouver 5
Victoria 4
Metro Vancouver Transit 3
206
POLICE AGENCY - 2017 OC DISCHARGES
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
RCMP 119
Vancouver 52
Victoria 12
Abbotsford 9
West Vancouver 5
Port Moody 4
Metro Vancouver Transit 3
Nelson 1
Saanich 1
POLICE AGENCY - 2017 CEW DISCHARGES
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
RCMP 187
Vancouver 47
Victoria 7
Abbotsford 3
New Westminster 3
West Vancouver 2
Delta 1
Saanich 1
Metro Vancouver Transit 1
252
14
POLICE AGENCY - 2017 FIREARM DISCHARGES
RCMP 12
Abbotsford 1
Vancouver` 1
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2019
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2009 to March 31, 2019. 
In March 2019 there were 104 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents a -34%  decrease 
over the number of deaths occurring in March 
2018 but a +42% increase over February 2019. 
In 2018, there were a total of 1,514 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This is an increase of 23) deaths 
over the 2017 numbers (1,491). 
Overall, the 2018 statistics amount to about four 
(4) people dying every day of the year.
The 1,514  overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 355%  increase over 2013. The report 
also attributed fentanyl laced drugs as accounting 
for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2019 with 65  illicit drug overdose deaths followed 
by 40-49 year-olds at 62  deaths. People aged 50-59 
years-old accounted for 59 deaths while those aged 
19-29 had 48 deaths. Vancouver had the most 
deaths at 72 followed by Surrey (33), Abbotsford 
(13), Victoria  (13), Kamloops (12), Burnaby (7), 
Langley (7), and New Westminster (7).   
Males continue to die at 
a l m o s t a 4 : 1 r a t i o 
compared to females. In 
January 2019, 212  males 
had died while  there 
were 56 female deaths.
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The 2019 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (87.6%) occurred inside while 
9.7%  occurred outside. For 7  death, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes 
hote l s , mote l s , rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 36 months preceding the 
declaration (Apr 2013-Mar 2016) totaled 1,376. 
The number of deaths in the 34 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Mar 2019) totaled 
4,046. This is an increase of 194%.
7263
77 155
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2009 to 
March 31, 2019.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. May 15, 2019.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 80.1%  of deaths, cocaine (49.7%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(31.3%), ethyl alcohol (26.4%), and heroin (18.6%). 
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2019 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2019.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
August 7-September 4, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
September 3-October 4, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
August 10-24
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
August 26-30, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills & Processes 
(INVE-1003) 
September 5-6, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Justice System (INVE-1000) 
September 9-11, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
 
September 14, 2019
Personal Safety (INVE-1013) 
September 23-26
Application for and Execution of Search Warrants 
(INVE 1006)
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
September 18-20, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
